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ROLL OVER LANGDELL,
TELL LLEWELLYN THE NEWS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION
Stephen R. Alton*
The origin of this essay is a presentation the author made at the Office
of the Attorney General of the State of Texas on December 10, 2008. This
essay is derived from the author's presentation, which originally was
entitled "A Brief and Highly Selective History of American Legal
Education and Jurisprudence. " In this essay, the author provides an
overview of the history and development of legal education in America,
emphasizing the establishment and evolution of the case method of
instruction in American law schools and focusing on the influence of
Americani jurisprudence on the development of legal education in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Drawing on Christopher
Columbus Langdell, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin N. Cardozo,
and Karl N. Llewellyn (among others), the author discusses the impact
that American legal education has had on American jurisprudence and the
reciprocal impact that American jurisprudence has had on both the means
and the ends of legal education in the United States. The author concludes
with a brief exploration of the direction ofAmerican legal education in the
early twenty-first century.
This essay had its origins in a presentation that I made at the Office of
the Attorney General of the State of Texas; that presentation resulted from
an introductory lecture on American legal history that I had been asked to
make to brand-new law students during my law school's orientation week.
* Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. A.B., Harvard
University; J.D., University of Texas; Ed.M., Harvard University; LL.M., Columbia
University. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions
made by his colleague, Professor Jason Gillmer, as well as the invaluable research
assistance provided by Sharon K. Lowry, Ph.D., J.D.
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When I was tapped to make that lecture on American legal history to
entering law students, I was a bit perplexed as to how to begin my
preparation. How should I approach the subject? After all, I periodically
teach a two-hour seminar on American legal history, and that seminar is
itself a condensation of a three-hour American Legal History course that I
had taught previously at our law school. Since I found more than a little
difficulty in paring down the materials for a course that met for a total of
forty-two hours into one that meets for a total of twenty-eight hours, how, I
wondered, would I be able to further condense those materials? An entire
course squeezed into a one-hour lecture-what a nightmare for a law
professor! While pondering this predicament, it dawned on me that,
instead of trying to outline for new law students the entirety of American
legal history in an hour's lecture, the time would be more fruitfully spent
exploring the history of just how we, in the United States, have come to
construct the path down which the new law students were about to travel-
a legal education.
This essay represents an overview-a brief and highly selective
history of legal education in America with a special emphasis on the
establishment and evolution of the case method of instruction in American
law schools. I will also focus on the influence of American jurisprudence
on the development of legal education in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Introduced by Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell
at Harvard Law School,' the case method has dominated American legal
education for more than a century, though not without some controversy
and a good deal of change in the method itself.2 Not surprisingly, legal
education has had a significant impact on American jurisprudence. In turn,
American jurisprudence has greatly affected both the means and the ends
of legal education in the United States. So, I would like to examine how
we came to where we are as wayfarers on the road of legal education; I
will conclude this essay with a brief look at the direction in which
American legal education may be headed in the near future.
Before beginning this examination, I need to single out two of the
many sources on which I have drawn freely in the course of this
undertaking. The first is the book Law School: Legal Education in
America from the 1850s to the 1980s, by Professor Robert Stevens.3 The
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 47 (1977).
2. ROBERT STEvENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION [N AMERICA FROM TH4E 1850s
TO THE 1980s, at xiv (1983).
3. Id.
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second is the late Professor Grant Gilmore's book, The Ages of American
Law.4
Legal education has never taken place in a vacuum. It is no more
possible to divorce eighteenth-, nineteenth-, or twentieth-century American
legal education from its social, intellectual, political, and professional
settings than it is to divorce contemporary American legal education from
such settings. Legal education is inextricably bound up with the social,
intellectual, political, and professional currents of the contemporaneous
American scene. Those currents have always moved and shaped legal
education in this country, and they continue to do so.
Legal education has itself had a profound influence on American
higher education in general, resulting largely from the innovative use of
the case method of study-a method of study which law students confront
on their very first day of class.' The case method has made its way from
the law into other fields of instruction, and it has had a significant impact
on those other fields.6 Yet, for all its influence, the case method is a
relatively recent innovation. In anything resembling its current form, it
sprang whole cloth, Athena-like, from the head of Christopher Columbus
Langdell, the dean of the Harvard Law School in the latter part of the
nineteenth century7 There is much more to say about Dean Langdell.
But, at the outset, there should be no mistake about this point: it is no
exaggeration to say that the case method of study, which he created, has
fostered the system of legal education that has become predominant today
in American law schools.8 Contemporary legal educators have perpetuated
this system and the curriculum that is integral to it, though both the system
and the curriculum have undergone significant modifications during the
140 years or so since the case method's birth. 9
Before exploring the birth of the case method, an exploration of what
came before it is in order-namely, the system of legal education in
4. GILMORE, supra note 1.
5. See STEVENS, supra note 2, at xiv.
6. See ROBERT F. BRUNER, SOCRATES' MUSE: REFLECTIONS ON EFFECTIVE CASE
DISCUSSION LEADERSHIP (2003) (discussing the use of the case-method approach as an
effective teaching tool in a variety of settings).
7. See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 42-47; STEVENS, supra note 2, at xv, 35-38. "The
appointment of Christopher Columbus Langdell as Dane Professor at Harvard Law
School on January 6, 1870, is widely acknowledged to mark the beginning of the modem
American law school." WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF
MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 3 (1994).
8. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 36-38.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 129-37.
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America that the case method supplanted. Perhaps the word "system" is
misleading when used to refer to legal education in the antebellum United
States. Legal education in revolutionary and early federalist America
largely-though not exactly-reflected English legal education.'0 Leaving
aside the issue of a bifurcated profession, one in which barristers engage
in litigation and solicitors engage in an office practice (to oversimplify
matters somewhat), those aspiring to enter the English legal profession,
either as banristers or as solicitors, had to engage in a lengthy
apprenticeship in a law office." This was as true in eighteenth-century
England as it remains today in that nation.'1
2
In America circa 1800, a man (for all intents and purposes, an aspirant
to the bar at this time was male-and a white male at that)'13 who desired to
prepare himself for a career in law had six options open to him. "4 First, he
could attend one of the few existing colleges in the newly formed United
States and could select from the paucity of courses offered in law and
related subjects such as politics, civil government, and international law.'15
Second, the aspiring lawyer could attend one of the very few existing
private law schools-that is, non-university-affiliated law schools-and
pursue his courses there.'16  Third, he could engage in the private, self-
directed study of law. '7 Fourth, he could clerk in the office of the clerk of
a court of record in his jurisdiction.'18 Fifth, if his resources afforded this
luxury, he could pursue his legal studies in England at one of the Ins of
Court, at which aspiring English barristers trained.'19
Sixth-and, by far, most usually-the would-be American lawyer
could serve an apprenticeship in the law office of a practicing lawyer.2
This form of apprenticeship was known as "reading law" and had been
10. STEvENS, supra note 2, at 3.
11. Id
12. Stephen R. Alton, Mandatory Prelicensure Legal Internship: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come Again?, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 137, 138 (1992). The following five
paragraphs are largely taken from the author's earlier work, with permission granted by
the Kansas Law Review.
13. Id. at 139.
14. Id. (citing 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUsT, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
AMERICA 173 (1965)) (noting five options available to an aspiring lawyer).
15. Id
16. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 19; STEVENS, supra note 2, at 3.
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common since colonial days.2 In the early days of the American republic,
"few would have considered offering themselves as full-time attorneys
without [having had] some period of [law office] apprenticeship." 2 2 Even
well into the nineteenth century, "the chief method of legal education [in
the United States] was the apprenticeship served in the office" of an
established practitioner of the law.2
What were the character and the quality of the apprenticeship training
received by the rising attorney in antebellum America?24  Here, theory
diverged greatly from practice. In theory:
[T]he legal clerkship system placed the student in [a law-
centered environmient,] where [his] education was a total and
many faceted experience. [The apprentice] would learn by
copying documents, transcribing contracts, and performing the
other mundane but necessary duties of a law office. He would
learn by listening to his fellow [apprentices], his
[practitioner-]teacher and other members of the bar. He would
learn by attending court and paying careful attention to all that
transpired there. He would learn by reading the law books
available to him and by taking copious notes . . .. In all aspects
of his training [the apprentice w]ould be guided by his mentor, a
lawyer versed in the law and concerned with the education of his
charge[].2
Some lawyers even provided room and board to their apprentices.2
Operating in this way, the apprenticeship method of training "assumed that
the clerk would learn both the practical and theoretical aspects of the law,
leaving his teacher's office after the prescribed number of years a complete
lawyer as well as a man steeped in the values of his profession."2
So much for the theory of a legal education gleaned from a law office
apprenticeship. How did that theory translate into practice? The ideal of
legal training and its reality often bore little resemblance to one another in
21. Id. (citing Charles R. McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in
Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124, 125 (1976)).
22. Id. (quoting STEVENS, supra note 2, at 3).
23. Id. at 140 (quoting 2 CHROUSr, supra note 14, at 173-74).
24. Id
25. Id (quoting McKirdy, supra note 2 1, at 127).
26. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 97 (2d ed. 1985).
27. Alton, supra note 12, at 140 (quoting McKirdy, supra note 2 1, at 127-28).
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antebellum America."8 in practice, the quality of the training that
apprentices received in mentors' law offices varied greatly.2
[The apprentice] commenced his studies whenever he wished [to
do so], studied as much or as little as he pleased, and more often
than not was wholly on his own as far as learning the law was
concerned. . . . [H]e received little formal instruction: theory
was hardly ever discussed . . . . There were no definite
requirements or standards, nor was there a systematic program of
study. The lawyer who [employed apprentices] might be a
conscientious and efficient man who tried to educate [his
charges] to the best of his ability [whatever that might have
been], or he might be indifferent or lazy and let [his apprentices
fend] for themselves[ when it came to their legal education. 30
Moreover, the apprenticeship system served as a device to keep the
practicing bar small and to keep senior lawyers in firm command of the
bar.' In sum, the theory behind law office apprenticeship as the primary
means of imparting legal training may have been a good one, but the
execution and the effects of apprenticeship left very much to be desired.3
Largely in reaction to the practical inadequacies of the apprenticeship
system as a means of training lawyers, the United States experienced an
expansion in formal, university-provided legal education in the middle of
the nineteenth century.3 During the Jacksonian era, a number of
institutions among the growing population of American universities
opened either departments of law or separate schools of law.3 Some of
these law departments and law schools flourished, but many more failed to
endure more than a few years .35 Still, the trend toward university-based
law schools had begun, however tentatively. 
3 6
The antebellum era was one of political, social, and economic
turbulence as the expanding nation lurched toward a war between the
28. Id (citing McKirdy, supra note 2 1, at 128).
29. id. (citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 97-9 8).
30. Id. (quoting 2 CHROUST, supra note 14, at 175).
31. Id. at 140 n.2 1 (citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 97).
32. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 24, 30 n.28.
33. Id at 21-22.
34. Id at 5.
35. Id at 8, 22-23.
36. Id at 21-22.
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states. The legal profession was by no means immune to this turbulence,
and lawyers came under attack from some democratic elements who
accused the attorneys of creating a lawyer-centered aristocracy in
America .37 Alexis de Tocqueville, a nineteenth-century French aristocrat
and observer, viewed America's lawyers as the nation's natural
aristocracy. 38  "Without a monarch or a clearly defined aristocracy..
[and] with little by way of competing professions, the new nation was
almost inevitably bound to rely on lawyers . . . . Lawyers became the
technicians of [nineteenth-century] change as the country expanded
economically and geographically ....
"The first half of the nineteenth century was [also] a period of great
judicial creativity."4 0 Some legal historians recall the epoch favorably. 41
In The Ages of American Law, Professor Grant Gilmore called pre-Civil
War America the "Age of Discovery"-the "Golden Age" of American
law.4 It was an age in which judges used the law to foster the burgeoning
new nation's economic vitality.4
The era's surge in university-based law departments and law schools
paralleled the heightened importance of the legal profession in an
increasingly industrialized America.4 The professionalization of the
American bar as a group of highly trained and skilled individuals
possessing much-needed expertise not commonly available to the general
public dates from this antebellum Golden Age.4 The American legal
system was developing in sync with the industrializing and expanding
American economic system. 46 "The owners of slaves, steamboat[s,]
and banks found that they needed lawyers.A And the number of attorneys
37. Id. at 7.
38. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1963) (1835) ("[In America, lawyers] form the highest political
class and the most cultivated portion of society. . .. If I were asked where I place the
American aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that . .. it occupies the judicial
bench and the bar.").
39. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 7.
40. Id. at 9.
41. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 1
(1977).
42. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 12, 39-40.
43. Id. at33 336. See generally HORWTZ, supra note 4 1, at xv, 1093 39.
44. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 20-23.
45. Id
46. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 34-36.
47. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 9.
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in politics, which had never been notably small, was also growing.48 fI
this period before the American Civil War, legislators all too often did
little to solve the nation's legal and political problems.4 Into this void
stepped America's judges and, with them, America's lawyers.50 The law,
lawyers, and judges became instruments of American economic and
geographic expansion.5
Then, abruptly, though hardly unexpectedly, the nation blew apart,
ostensibly over the question of slavery. The compromise on the slavery
issue-the compromise that had paved the way for the United States
Constitution-made the federal union possible, but this compromise
merely postponed the inevitable day of reckoning. 52 That day of reckoning
finally came in 1861, and it lasted four bloody, agonizing, tragic years.
Ostensibly, the fight was about slavery; yet, the fight was really about the
very nature of the union itself. Where did the boundary lie between the
spheres of federal and state power? The answer to this question was
provided at the time by the sheer force of arms, but the question-and the
answer-continues to be explored and debated to this very day.
Professor Gilmore called the next period in American legal history-
the years between the end of the Civil War and the end of the First World
War-the "Age of Faith." 53  It was an age of legal formalism, when
Christopher Columbus Langdell, who was appointed the first dean of the
Harvard Law School in 1870, introduced the case method at Harvard.5
Legal education has not been the same since.
Langdell believed that law is a science.55 In his words, "all the
48. Id.
49. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 15, 36.
50. Id
51. Id. at 36-38.
52. Id at 37.
53. Idat 41-42, 64-67.
54. Id. at 42-47. According to Gilmore:
One of the hidden costs of the national agony which culminated in the Civil
War may have been the crippling of our legal system. If judges like [Joseph]
Story[, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court,] and [Lemuel]
Shaw[, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,] were
driven into formalism [by having to wrestle with laws relating to slavery, such
as the Fugitive Slave Act], so were many lesser judges. And once the tools of
formalism have been used, even in a good cause, they are there, ready to hand,
tempting. It is among other things extremely easy to decide cases according to
the letter of a statute or of an established rule of law, without fuirther inquiry.
ld. at 38-39.
5 5. Id at 42.
Vol. 35346
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available materials of that science are contained in printed boos.... [T]he
library is . . . to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the
chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history [is] to the
zoologists, the botanical garden [is] to the botanists. 5 From Lang deli's
basic proposition that law is a science, two subsidiary propositions
followed .5 ' First, "legal truth is a species of scientific truth"; that is, once
legal truth has been discovered and demonstrated, it endures,
unchanging.5 Second, there are in fact relatively few fundamental legal
doctrines. 59 If one found one of these few legal truths and applied it
scientifically to the case at hand, the legal result should be virtually
automatic and invariable. 60 This was the accepted faith of Langdell and
his acolytes.6
The Langdellians formulated legal theories that would cover broad
areas of the law and "reduce an unruly diversity to a manageable unity."q
62
The law library was the lawyer's "laboratory," and the reported appellate
cases were the lawyer's "experimental materials."6 But, according to
Langdell, most cases were wrongly decided, and these cases were,
therefore, "'worse than useless"': they were positively harmful.64 "The
function of the legal scholar. ... is to winnow .. . from the chaff those very
few cases which have . .. been correctly decided and which," if followed,
will lead to the Platonic ideal of enduring legal truth.6
Langdell's era was a time dominated by formalistic thinking about the
law, which has come to be called "legal formalism.",6 6 As already noted,
the Langdellians viewed the law in terms of a relatively limited number of
fundamental legal truths in certain well-defined areas of the law .6' From
the myriad of reported cases, the student would finid the pertinent legal rule
56. Christopher C. Langdell, Dane Professor, Harvard Law Sch., Address to Harvard
Law School Association at the "'Quarter-Millennial" Celebration of Harvard University
(Nov. 5, 1886), in The Harvard Law School, 3 L.Q. REV. 118, 124 (1887).
57. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 42.
58. Idat 42-43.




63. Id. at 47.
64. Id (quoting C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS,
at vi (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 1999) (1871)).
65. Id
66. Id. at 38-39.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 53-65.
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and mechanically apply it to the problem at hand.6 The result would be
foreordained (indeed, even easy) once the applicable legal rule had been
discovered.69
This was the thinking of the Legal Formalists-Langdell and his
disciples-and this thinking was ascendant during the years roughly
between 1865 and 1920.70 Professor Gilmore believed that every legal
system, sooner or later, must go through its "Age of Faith," its age of
formalism.7" After all, "[tlhe idea of a body of law, fixed for all time and
invested with an almost supernatural authority, is irresistibly attractive-
[not only for the judges,] not only for the lawyers and their clients," but
also for the public at large.7 Most people prefer certainty over
uncertainty, order over chaos.7 After the terrible war between the states,
Americans sought "peace, repose, and tranquility."7 The certainty of legal
formnalism furthered these ends, contributing to "the illusion that a stable
body of law was not only a theoretical possibility but [was] an
accomplished fact.",75  The allure of legal formalism has had a revival
throughout much of the American judiciary during the last few decades,
but a discussion of contemporary legal formalism is the subject for another
essay at another time.
The certainty of legal formnalism. also served the ends of laissez-faire
economics, which came to predominate during this era.7 Courts staffed
by formalist judges became increasingly hostile to social legislation.77
Social legislation not only sought to alter the status quo that legal
formalism buttressed but also trespassed on the judges' terrain-that of
making law in the guise of merely appearing to apply it.78 Laissez-faire
economics and legal formalism went hand-in-hand in late-nineteenth- and
early-twentieth-century America.7
During this period, the movement toward professionalization of the
bar intensified, mirroring Langdell's push for a more intellectually
68. See supra text accompanying notes 53-65.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 53-65.
70. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 11-12.
71. Id. at 64.
72. Id.
73. Id at 65.
74. Id.
75, Id
76. Id at 65-66.
77. Id. at 62-64.
78. See id at 62.
79. Id at 66.
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rigorous legal education."' As corporations grew so did the law firms that
served them .8 1 The legal profession, during the later nineteenth century,
became a vehicle for upward social and economic mobility for many of its
82
practitioners. Those who moved up the social and political ladder during
this age were almost exclusively white, middle-class, protestant males of
Western European ancestry.
893
The growth of formal legal education in this era sprang from the belief
that the science of law was an ideal background for gentlemen of
substance and the system of law-office apprenticeship-the informal
practice of reading law-was simply inadequate as a means of educating
such gentlemen. 84 It should be understood that law-office apprenticeship
as the primary means of legal education died slowly. In 1900, it was still
the only legal education that the majority of American lawyers received ;
8 1
but the elite lawyers-those who were becoming leaders of the bar and
powerful servants of the corporate giants-were increasingly being trained
in university-based law schools that employed Langdell's case method. 
86
Increasingly, those elite lawyers were calling for more rigorous standards
in both legal education and bar admission. 87 These standards included
written bar examinations.8
The stated purpose of these rigorous standards was to increase the
competence of the profession." The American Bar Association was
founded for this express purpose in 1878.90 The result (intentional or
otherwise) of the heightened standards in legal education and bar
admission was greater exclusivity in bar admissions to the detriment of the
rising tide of immigrants who began to flock to America's shores in the
years after the Civil War.91
By 1920, the number of American law schools was growing rapidly,
80. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 73; LAPIANA, supra note 7, at 14.
81. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 22, 51.
82. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 21-23 (1976).
83. Id. at 25-26; STEVENS, supra note 2, at 100-02.
84. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 2 1-22, 73.
85. Id. at 24.
86. Id. at 38-39, 51-52, 60-63, 96.
87. Id. at 172-74.
88. Id. at 94-95, 98-99.
89. Id. at 92.
90. Id. at 27, 92.
91. Id. at 100-02; AUERBACH, supra note 82, at 62-64.
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and most of those law schools were emulating Langdell's Harvard. 
92
Thus, there was general use of the case method of study; there also was
general use of a three-year course of law school study (another Langdellian
innovation).93 Still in the post-World War I future was the time when
those three-year law schools would become exclusively graduate
schools-that is, when students would attend law school after receiving
their undergraduate degrees. 94 Before the time of Langdell, the study of
law at a college or university was an undergraduate pursuit; graduates in
law received a bachelor of laws degree. 95 This conformed to the practice
in England, a practice which is extant in contemporary Great Britain.
Langdell sought to make the law school a graduate school.96 He did so
with limited success beyond Harvard in his own lifetime,9 but that
situation changed rapidly after the First World War and continued to
accelerate after the Second World War.98 Thus, by the 1 960s, law school
entrants were required to have a four-year undergraduate degree.99 The
American law school had finally become a graduate institution.
Langdell's legacy has been hotly controverted in recent years.
Professor Gilmore, emphasizing the narrowness of Langdell's conception
of the law as science, called him "an essentially stupid man who, early in
his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the
tenacity of genius. . .. However absurd, however mischievous, however
deeply rooted in error it may have been, Langdell's idea shaped. ... legal
thinking for [generations]."' 00 A somewhat different and more positive
view of Langdell and his followers was expressed more recently by
Professor William LaPiana:
Whatever the shortcomings of the legal education Langdell
and his colleagues created, present-day legal education is still
shaped by the actions and beliefs of those teachers and scholars
of the preceding century, and there is something appealing in the
clear role for legal education [that] they envisioned. They knew
92. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 123.
93. Id. at 36-37.
94. Id. at 37.
95. Id. at 36-37.
96. Id,
97. Id.
98. Id. at 205.
99. Idat 209.
100. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 42.
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what they had to do and they went on to do it. In the process,
they were confident that they were training their students to
fulfill the most demanding tasks of a most demanding
profession.'0 '
History's judgment on Langdell's legacy may be mixed, but the man's
significance in the history of American legal education is beyond dispute.
Langdell's case method is still in use in today's American law schools,
albeit in a modified form. Yet, the method's use and usefulness are
vigorously debated by contemporary legal educators.
Just what were (and still are) the advantages of the case method of
legal education? For Langdell and his followers, as previously discussed,
the method was scientific and, thus, practical;'02 the method's ultimate
goal was to find the golden nugget of legal truth amid so much dross.103
Most who came of age after the generation of Langdell and his followers
questioned the Langdellians' certainty on this point.'10 Both Langdell and
his critics, however, agreed on one important advantage of the case
method-perhaps the most important aspect of the method and, certainly,
the one responsible for its continued use and vitality in contemporary legal
education. The main argument in favor of the case method of instruction
has been its ability to teach the skill of thinking like a lawyer-the skill of
critical thinking and analysis that forms the basis of legal problem-
solving.'05 In the estimation of Professor Stevens, "the lasting influence of
the case method [has been] to transfer the basis of American legal
education from substance to [process]."0  This shift from substance to
process is particularly marked during the first year of legal education. 
0 7
Methodology-critical thinking-more than substance has become the
nub of legal education. This is the lasting legacy of Christopher Columbus
Langdell.
In addition to the theoretical advantages of the case method, the
method presents practical advantages-and some disadvantages-as well.
As law students soon find out, the case method of instruction is
intellectually stimulating, as professor and student interact in the
101. LAPIANA, supra note 7, at 170.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 53-65.
103. LAPIANA, supra note 7, at 103, 108.
104. STEvENs, supra note 2, at 269.
105. Id. at 268-69.
106. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 270-71.
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discussion of important legal issues, rules, and policies. 08 Indeed, we
professors often gain insight from the class discussion that the case method
fosters. This insight makes us better teachers. On the other hand, the case
method is a time-consuming way to impart information, and it is not the
best way to teach certain important legal skills (statutory analysis and legal
drafting being but two important examples). Therefore, the case method
has been modified and supplemented in today's law school-so much so
that Dean Langdell, were he resurrected, would hardly recognize much of
what goes on in our classrooms. While the future direction of American
legal education continues to be a topic of debate, there is general
agreement that modem American legal education represents a synthesis of
legal theory (in the form of predominantly case method courses), on the
one hand, and legal practice (in the form of predominantly clinical and
practice skills courses), on the other hand. 0(9
How did we arrive at this synthesis, this modification of Langdell's
original system? The road to this synthesis wound through the America of
the 1920s and 1930s, the period of boom and bust between the two world
wars."10 During these years, there arose an important movement in
American jurisprudence that has come to be called "Legal Rels.
The Legal Realists were skeptical of the old, formalist, Langdellian
order." 2 Law, an exact science?" 3 Nonsense, they scoffed!"14 The law
was not a value-free system of objective, black-letter rules-not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky."' Legal rules-and the decisions made
by the courts when applying those rules-were hardly neutral." 6 In the
opinion of the Realists, the Formalists of the Langdellian era had used the
law to bolster the laissez-faire economic system," 7 yet this was despite the
108. Id. at 269.
109. For a survey of current trends and practices in-as well as some prescriptions
for-legal education, see Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION:
A VISION AND A ROAD MAP (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007); DAVID I.C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL
2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE (2009); Amy Deen Westbrook, Learning
from Wall Street: A Venture in Transactional Legal Education, 27 QUiNNiPiAC L. REv.
227 (2009).
110. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 79.
111. Idat 78.
112. Idat 79.




117. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 65-66.
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Formalists' claim that they merely were applying timeless legal principles
that had been "scientifically" discovered.'"
8
In contrast to the Langdellian Formnalists, the Legal Realists took a
functional or instrumental view of the law." 9 Legal principles are not
carved in stone but are malleable in accordance with the tenor of the times,
and the law can and should be used to effect positive social change. In the
words of the proto-realist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men,
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed. The
law embodies the story of a nation's development through many
centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." 0
In writing these words during the late-nineteenth-century heyday of legal
formalism, Holmes was anticipating the legal realist movement by at least
a generation.
At the dawn of the age of legal realism, Benjamin Cardozo, the man
who would become Holmes's successor on the United States Supreme
Court, concurred in Holmes's assessment of the law. In an influential
118. Id. at 62.
119. See generally id. at 68-69 (discussing the divergence between the two schools of
thought).
120. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 1 (The
Legal Classics Library 1982) (1881). Professor Gilmore, among others, might take issue
with my characterization of Holmes as a proto-realist. Contrary to the popular view of
Holmes as the "Yankee from Olympus," Gilmore thought that: "[t]he real Holmes was
savage, harsh, and cruel, a bitter and lifelong pessimist who saw in the course of human
life nothing but a continuing struggle in which the rich and powerful impose their will on
the poor and weak." GILMORE, supra note 1, at 48-49. Holmes did not reject the idea
that law was a science, but his view of legal science was more pragmatic and more
sociological than the view of the law held by the Langdellians. Id. at 50. However,
"Holmes never shared the prevalent hostility toward social legislation," even though "he
thought that most of it was silly and useless." Id. at 67. It is Holmes's acceptance of the
inherent legitimacy of social legislation in a democracy-an acceptance that ran counter
to the prevailing view of the contemporary legal establishment-that prompts me to label
Holmes a proto-realist, even though Gilmore probably would say that I have gone too far
in my characterization. See id at 48, 66-67.
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series of lectures entitled The Nature of the Judicial Process, 12 1 which
were given at Yale Law School in 192 1, Cardozo asserted:
[Liogic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted
standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in
combination shape the progress of the law. Which of these
forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon the
comparative importance or value of the social interests that will
be thereby promoted or impaired. 
12 2
Cardozo went on to reveal a judicial secret that was central to the
philosophy of the Legal Realists: Judges legislate from the bench, and
there is nothing new or nefarious about such judicial legislation. 123 This is
a central insight into the nature of judging in a common-law system-a
feature of the Anglo-American legal system that was (and still is) too often
ignored:
One of the most fundamental social interests is that law shall be
uniform and impartial.. .. Therefore in the main there shall be
adherence to precedent. There shall be symmetrical
development [of the law] . . . . But symmetrical development
may be bought at too high a price. Uniformity ceases to be a
good when it becomes uniformity of oppression. The social
interest served by symmetry or certainty must then be balanced
against the social interest[s] served by equity and fairness or
other elements of social welfare...
If you ask how he [i.e., the judge] is to know when one
interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and
study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here, indeed, is the
point of contact between the legislator's work and his. . .. Each
indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence. No
doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only
between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. How far he
may go without traveling beyond the walls of the interstices
cannot be staked out for him upon a chart. He must learn it for
121. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
122. Id. at 112.
123. Id. at 113, 116.
Vol. 35354
2010] American Legal Education35
himself. . ... None the less, within the confines of these open
spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice moves with a
freedom which stamps its action as creative. The law which is
the resulting product is not found, but made.'124
One should notice that Cardozo said that frequently the law "is not found,
but made,"12 5 thus rejecting the Formalists' assertion to the contrary-i.e.,
that the law is not made but found by judges and lawyers.126
No doubt in response to half a century of formalist jurisprudence,
Cardozo opined that judicial "legislation" in a common-law system is
neither new nor threatening: "There is in truth nothing revolutionary or
even novel in this view of the judicial function. It is the way that courts
have gone about their business for centuries in the development of the
common law. .. . Much of the process has been unconscious or nearly
so. Quoting his predecessor Holmes, Cardozo noted that:
"We do not realize ... how large a part of our law is open to
reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public
mind. . . . I think that the judges themselves have failed
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of
social advantage [i.e., consideration of public policy]." 2
Thus, as Holmes recognized a generation before Cardozo delivered his
famous lectures on the nature of the judicial process, the life of the law is
experience (social experience), and not mere, cold logic.
The views of the Legal Realists, supported by their judicial forebears
such as Holmes and Cardozo, shattered Langdellian certainty in the law,
but the Realists themselves did not substitute any systemic pedagogical
approach of their own in formalism's stead.129  In fact, in the period
124. Id. at 112-15.
125. Id. at 115.
126. Modem-day legal formalists who decry "judicial activism" should take note of
Cardozo's point. At the very least, it should be recognized that this debate between
formalists and instrumentalists was joined more than a century ago (in the days of
Langdell, Holmes, and Cardozo) and has continued more or less unabated ever since.
127. CARDOZO, supra note 121, at 116-17 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. at 117-19 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Supreme Judicial Court
of Mass., The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston
University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in The Path of the Law, 10 HARY. L. REv. 457,
466-67 (1897)).
129. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 155-56; GILMORE, supra note 1, at 77-79.
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between the two world wars (the high watermark of legal realism),
American law schools continued to use the case method of teaching. 
130
Now, however, law professors began to question the previously accepted
tenets of the law and legal education, tenets to which the Langdellian
Formalists had clung with such tenacity.13 1 The most prominent of these
tenets, of course, was the notion that law was an exact science, much like a
natural science.13 2  The Realists generally admitted that the law was a
science, but it was a social science-an inexact science.' 33 Moreover, the
law was heavily influenced by such other social sciences as economics,
sociology, political science, and even psychology.1
34
During legal realism's salad days, numerous changes were made at the
nation's elite law schools. New casebooks appeared, and these casebooks
included materials other than cases-materials such as statutes and
explanatory text.' 3 5 New courses appeared-courses in the area of public
law, courses which took interdisciplinary approaches, and courses, such as
seminars and clinical programs, that deviated from the standard question-
and-answer, case-method routine.136 More and more, law professors were
calling their students' attention to the world beyond the law school walls
(that is, to experience) and to the fact that this extramural world had as
profound an impact on the law as the law had on that world.1
37
Many of the realist law professors practiced what they preached by
taking leaves of absence from academia to serve in government,
particularly in Franlin Roosevelt's New Deal.'138  Perhaps the most
prominent among them was the late Justice William 0. Douglas, who left
his teaching position at Yale Law School to serve on the Securities and
Exchange Commission before his 1939 elevation to the United States
Supreme Court.'139 To professors like Douglas, public service provided the
forum in which the law could be employed in the public interest.
In the years following the Second World War, the reforms of the
Realists spread from the elite law schools and reached the regional and
130. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 79.
131. Idat 79,87.
132. Id. at 87.
133. Id
134. Id at 87-88.
135. STEvENs, supra note 2, at 158.
136. Id. at 158-60.
137. Idatl160.
138. Id.;GILMORE, supra note 1, at 9 1.
139. STEvENs, supra note 2, at 140.
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local schools. 140  The result is that legal education today represents a
synthesis of the Langdellian, formalist thesis and the realist, functionalist
antithesis. In a very real sense, we in the academy are all legal realists,
particularly during the first year of law school.
The late Professor Karl Llewellyn, one of the leaders of the legal
realist movement, captured the potential of the functional or instrumental
approach to law in his book, The Bramble Bush. 14 1 According to
Llewellyn, every case lays down a rule of law on which the case is
decided. 142  In a subsequent case, that earlier rule-the precedent-is
merely a starting point for the contestants and their attorneys. 14 ' The
attorney who seeks to convince the court not to apply the precedent to the
present controversy will endeavor to narrow and distinguish the earlier
rule-to confine the rule of the earlier case to its particular facts.
1 "4
Llewellyn called this process "the dogma which is applied to unwelcome
precedents." 14 5 Conversely, opposing counsel, who seeks to convince the
court to apply the precedent to the controversy at hand, will endeavor to
expand the application of the earlier rule. 146 Llewellyn dubbed this process
the "device for capitalizing welcome precedents.~
This duality of the nature of precedent was-and is-a fundamental
concept within the law:
[T]he doctrine of precedent .. . is ... two-headed.... [I]t is not
one doctrine, nor one line of doctrine, but two, and two which,
applied at the same time to the same precedent, are
contradictory of each other. . . . [T]here is one doctrine for
getting rid of precedents deemed troublesome and one doctrine
for making use of precedents that seem helpful. . .. [T]hese two
doctrines exist side by side. . .. Until you realize this you do not
see how it is possible for law to change and to develop, and yet
to stand on the past. You do not see how it is possible to avoid
the past mistakes of courts, and yet to make use of every happy
insight for which a judge in writing may have found
140. See idi. at 209, 2 13-14.
141. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930).
142. Id at 72.
143. Id
144. Id.
145. Id. at 73.
146. Id. at 74.
147. Id.
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expression.... For look again at this matter of the difficulty of
the doctrine. The strict view [of precedent-that view that cuts
the past away-is hard to use. An ignorant, an unskilful judge
will find it hard to use: the past will bind him. But the skilful
judge-he whom we would make free-is thus made free. He
has the knife in hand; and he can free himself. 
14 8
And, in a parting shot fired across the Langdellians' bow, Llewellyn
concluded:
People . . . who think that precedent produces or ever did
produce a certainty that did not involve matters of judgment and
of persuasion, or who think that what I have described involves
improper equivocation by the courts or departure from the court-
ways of some golden age-such people simply do not know our
system of precedent in which they live.'1
4 9
Where, then, does all of this leave us today in legal education? It is an
inescapable truth that contemporary American legal education is a product
of its past. From the Langdellians, we have inherited the case method of
instruction and the three-year course of graduate study that is law
school.'150 Thanks to the Legal Realists, we no longer view the law as an
exact science; instead, we see it as an art-a profession-to be employed
in the public interest.'15 ' Thanks also go to the Realists for transforming
the nature of the case method and for at least significantly expanding (if
not entirely revolutionizing) what form and substance are acceptable in a
law school classroom. As we have seen, the Langdellians pulled
American legal education from its roots, emphasizing the primacy of
legal theory over legal practice, at least in the classroom. The Legal
Realists fought the Langdellians on the latters' home field-the legal
academy-with the Realists trying to shake their predecessors'
seemingly unshakeable certainty. One legal realist who might have led a
revolution in American legal education, had he found a sufficient number
of followers, was Jerome Frank. Over several decades in the first half of
the twentieth century, Frank repeatedly campaigned for a more skills-
148. Id at 74-75.
149. Id. at 76. Once again, present-day legal formalists should take note of Llewellyn's
admonition, although they are unlikely to do so.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 84-99.
15 1. See supra text accompanying notes 1 29-40.
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Jerome Frank's call was sounded anew when the "MacCrate Report"
was issued two generations later.'153 This thoughtful document examined
the professional skills and values that every lawyer should possess.' 
54
The report recommended that law schools not simply leave the teaching
of these skills and values to the profession but endeavor to instill these
skills and values in their students during their years in law school. 1
5
Among the conclusions of the MacCrate Report was the following:
"Law schools and the practicing bar should look upon the development
of lawyers as a common enterprise, recognizing that legal educators and
practicing lawyers have different capacities and opportunities to impart
to future lawyers the skills and values required for the competent and
responsible practice of law."'156 The report proposed a law school
pedagogy that included professional skills and values in addition to-but
not in substitution for-the traditional Socratic give-and-take of the case
method, which so successfully taught generations of American law
students the fundamental, practical, professional skill of thinking like a
lawyer (i.e., critical analysis). '57 The MacCrate Report advocated a
reweaving of the two main strands of legal training-the analytical and
the practical-into one tapestry; ideally, American law schools would
offer their students more training in professional skills and values, in
addition to training their students in the skill of legal analysis., 58 This
process had already been initiated with the advent of law school clinics
and externship programs, but the MacCrate Report called for more of
such opportunities and for additional classroom settings in which law
students would learn these other professional skills and values.'5"
Recently, the "Carnegie Report' 60 has reexamined the familiar
152. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REv.
907 (1933); Jerome Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 20 (195 1).
153. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992).
154. See id at 135-221.
155. See id. at 233-36, 330-34.
156. Id. at 330.
157. Id. at 233-36.
158. See idat 330-34.
159. See id.
160. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 109. This is commonly referred to as the Carnegie
Report; unfortunately, a detailed examination and analysis of this fascinating report is
beyond the scope of this essay.
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territory of legal education and has made suggestions that transcend
those set out a generation earlier in the MacCrate Report. The Carnegie
Report urges not merely reweaving the strands of legal education but
frully integrating them at the law school level, using what the report terms
an "integrative" strategy of legal education; this integrative strategy
would draw upon the best aspects of inculcating professional skills and
values in aspiring attorneys seen during the days of law-office
apprenticeships:'16 1
The core insight behind the integrative strategy is that effective
educational efforts must be understood in holistic rather than
atomistic terms. For law schools, this means that, far from
remaining uncontaminated by each other, each aspect of the legal
apprenticeship-the cognitive, the practical, and the ethical-
social-takes on part of its character from the kind of
relationship it has with the others...
... [I]n virtually no law schools do these experiences
systematically reach all of the students.1
6 2
The introduction to the Carnegie Report is itself an essay on the
history of American legal education.16 1 While acknowledging Langdell's
innovations in legal education and their general acceptance by American
law schools, the report notes the hostility with which many Langdellians
viewed their students' acquisition of practical, professional skills (at least
during their years of formal legal education).'16 As did the MacCrate
Report before it, the Carnegie Report acknowledges the value of the case
method of instruction, with its Socratic dialogue, for what this method
does well (particularly during the first year of law school), which is to
impart not merely substantive law but an analytical process:
"Recognizing the priority of analytical thinking in preparing lawyers, we
16 1. Id. at 19 1.
162. Id
163. Id. at 1-20.
164. Id. at 4-12. The report states:
[Olne of the less happy legacies of the inherited academic ideology [i.e.,
inherited by the legal academy from Langdell and his followers] has been a
history of unfortunate misunderstandings and even conflict between defenders
of theoretical legal learning and champions of a legal education that includes
introduction to the practice of law.
Id. at 8.
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place formal knowledge as the first element within the integrative
framework we propose for legal education." 6 Indeed, the authors note:
"[Liegal education has refined important lessons of value to other
professional fields. The chief of these is the extraordinary power of the
first-year experience as a way of beginning the formation of future
professionals. 6
The Carnegie Report in no way calls for the abolition of the case
method of instruction, but the priority and the importance of teaching
analytical thinking "should not be misconstrued as sufficiency." 167 The
report concludes that law schools should use other methods of instruction
beyond the case method, especially-though not exclusively-after the
first year of law school.16 1 Echoing the MacCrate Report's
recommendations, the Carnegie Report urges the legal academy to adopt
modes of pedagogy that provide the opportunities for law students to
learn in a way that combines the main elements of "legal
professionalism--conceptual knowledge, [professional] skill, and moral
discernment."169 The report asserts that this is an historic opportunity to
advance legal education by synthesizing the theoretical and practical
strains of legal education that Langdell and his followers put asunder in
the nineteenth century.170 Given the recommendations of the Carnegie
Report, reiterating and amplifying much of what the MacCrate Report
had suggested years earlier, the time does seem ripe for a pronounced
shift in American legal education-a shift that will put even greater
emphasis on teaching our students the professional skills and values
required in the practice of law.
History teaches us that legal education is hardly a static institution.
From the Langdellians to the Legal Realists and from the MacCrate
Report to the Carnegie Report, American legal education has engendered
debate and institutional change in the past and continues to engender
debate and institutional change in the present. Admittedly, change often
comes rather slowly to legal education; after all, the law has always
tended to be a backward-looking profession. The legal training I received
three decades ago is by no measure identical to that received by the
generation of attorneys who preceded me, nor was my education identical
165. Id at 13.
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id. at 13.
168. See id. at 185-92.
169. Id. at 12.
170. Id
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to that which my students receive today, with its somewhat greater
emphasis on professional skills. A generation from now, law students will
be educated in ways that we may find difficult to imagine, thanks, in large
part, to the on-going revolution in technology.'17 1 We are already seeing
the advent of classes taught entirely online, which, just a few short years
ago, would have been unthinkable-indeed even impermissible-under
earlier American Bar Association standards for the accreditation of
American law schools. Today, there are even entire online law schools,
without any bricks or mortar at all. While none of these virtual law
schools, with their virtual classrooms, has yet been accredited by the
American Bar Association, that day may well arrive.
Still in all, much of what went on in the legal academy yesterday, what
goes on there today, and what will go on there tomorrow has not changed.
The fundamental values of learning, professionalism, and public service
have changed relatively little since the days of Dean Christopher
Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School, although the societal context
in which those values operate has been thoroughly transformed during the
course of the last century.
There have been lawyers on both sides of all important controversies
in American history. Many of our revolutionary leaders were lawyers, but
some of the most prominent colonial lawyers remained loyal to the British
Crown. In the late eighteenth century, there were attorneys on both sides
of the debate over the ratification of our Constitution. In the nineteenth
century, some lawyers fought to preserve slavery even if that meant
destroying the Union, while others fought to preserve the Union by
destroying slavery. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
attorneys championed social change and corporate primacy; they
championed the New Deal and the Old Order. And, in the middle part of
the twentieth century, lawyers led the battles for civil rights and for
segregation.
I try not to influence my law students' political views, certainly not
while I am on the podium (or roaming the classroom). I know that some
of my students might disagree with that statement, but I believe it and do
my imperfect best not to use my influence for political purposes.
However, I have tried to inculcate on my students professional values
based on the idea that the choosing of sides is not, and never has been, a
value-neutral process. Students must bear in mind that while there are at
171. On the matter of the influence and use of technology in contemporary legal
education, see generally THOMSON, supra note 109.
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least two sides to every debate, the moral force of the arguments on each
side is not necessarily equal. No matter which side of the controversy a
student or a lawyer ultimately embraces, it is up to that person to be a
constructive force acting in the public interest, as he or she may reasonably
see it. I hope that in making their professional choices, students and
attorneys will be animated by the knowledge that they can and should act
in the public interest. Perhaps this is the most important life lesson that a
student will learn during his or her years in law school. Speaking not only
as a law professor but also as a member of society, I hope that all law
students will learn this lesson well and will carry it with them into their
practice of our learned and noble profession.

